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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JENSEN and DON 
:HRISTENSEN, djb /a 
BERNINA SEWING MACHINE CO., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
HAROLD L. BARRICK and 
FRED M. POULSON, d/b/a 
MODERN SEWING MACHINE CO., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 10027 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appeal from order of perpetual stay of execution on 
question of whether debt for misappropriation of trust 
funds, conversion of property delivered on consignment, 
and conversion of mortgaged property and collection of 
assigned fund and appropriation of proceeds is discharge-
able in bankruptcy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Order vacating District Court's order of perpetual stay 
of execution, or failing that, remanding the matter for 
trial on issue of dischargeability of debts in question. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants delivered merchandise (sewing machines, 
etc.) to Respondents under terms of agreement (R. 4-7) 
under which Appellants retained title until merchandise 
was sold to customers for cash (R. 4, Par. 2; R. 5, Par. 4; 
R. 6, Par. 12), whereupon title to proceeds of sale vested 
in Appellants (R. 4, Par. 2) to be held in trust for the 
benefit of Appellants and to be forthwith remitted to 
Appellants (R. 6, Par. 12). At the time of the execution of 
said agreement, Respondents acknowledged that they 
were holding the sum of $2,831.37 cash in trust for the 
benefit of Appellants (R. 4) . Respondents failed to remit 
or to account for said trust funds or the proceeds received 
from sale of consigned merchandise to Appellants or to 
return or to account for unsold merchandise when de-
mand for its return was made upon them (R. 2, Par. 2 & 
3), a grand total of $5,617.83 (R. 1, Par. 3; R. 3, Par. 7; 
R.16). 
Respondents further secured their debt to Appellants 
by a written agreement (R. 8-9) wherein they assigned 
$2,710.32 of reserve funds held by finance companies 
(R. 8, Par. 1-3) to Appellants and expressly agreed that 
all amounts received by them from said assigned funds, 
or from the sale of merchandise pledged by third parties 
in connection therewith, would be held in trust for the 
benefit of and forthwith remitted to Appellants (R. 8-9, 
Par. 5). Respondents collected said trust funds but failed 
to remit any part thereof to Appellants (R. 1, Par. 5; R. 2, 
Par. 4). 
Respondents also further secured their debt to Appel-
lants by executing a chattel mortgage on two motor ve-
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3 
hicles subject to existing mortgage thereon in favor of a 
third party (R. 8, Par. 4). The Appellants' chattel mort-
gage was not recorded at the request of Respondents and 
because of the prior mortgage thereon. The vehicles were 
wrongfully sold by Respondents in utter disregard of the 
mortgage in favor of Appellants and the proceeds appro-
priated by the Respondents (R. 2, Par. 5). Appellants filed 
an affidavit for attachment by reason of "misappropria-
tion of trust funds" (R. 10) and a complaint alleging mis-
appropriation and conversion of trust funds, of merchan-
dise delivered on consignment, of proceeds from sale 
thereof, of funds received from finance companies which 
had been assigned to Appellants, and of vehicles mort-
gaged to Appellants and of the proceeds received there-
from (R. 1-9), and obtained a judgment by default against 
the Respondents (R. 16), after the Respondents had 
filed bankruptcy (R. 19). 
Respondent Poulson's motion for permanent stay of 
execution (R. 17-18) was granted, and the order entered 
recited that Appellants' claim was a dischargeable obli-
gation which had been discharged by Respondent's bank-
ruptcy (R. 34). Appellants prosecute this appeal from 
that order for the reason that the Respondents' debt to 
Appellants is not a dischargeable debt under Section 17 
of the bankruptcy law (11 U.S. Code Annotated 35). The 
Respondent's discharge in bankruptcy expressly recites 
that it does not discharge debts which are excepted from 
the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy (R. 19). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' JUDGMENT WAS NOT DIS-
CHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY BECAUSE OF RE-
SPONDENTS' OBTAINING PROPERTY BY FALSE 
PRETENSES AND THEIR WILLFUL AND MALI-
CIOUS INJURY TO THE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY 
RIGHTS. 
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act ( 11 U.S. Code Anno-
tated 35) reads in part as follows: 
"Sec. 17 Debts Not Affected by a Discharge. -
a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt 
from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . 
(2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false 
pretenses or false representations, or for willful and 
malicious injuries to the person or property of 
another, ... " (emphasis added) 
Entry of the default certificate (R. 15) and the judg-
ment by default (R. 16) was an admission by Respondents 
of every traversable allegation of Appellants' cause of 
action (Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman, Judge, 38 
Utah 326, 113 P. 63), and is tantamount to an admission 
that the Appellants were entitled to a judgment as 
prayed. ( 30A Am. J ur 296, Sec. 223 and cases there cited; 
98 ALR 1020; 11 LRA NS 803; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 177 
P. 2d 364, 78 C.A. 2d 127). In determining the nature of 
the cause of action and whether it is dischargeable, the 
Court will look behind a judgment to ascertain from the 
record whether the obligation which was merged in the 
judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Lyon v. Lyon, 
115 U. 466; 206 P. 2d 148; National Finance Company of 
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>rovo v. Daley, 14 U. 2d 263, 382 P. 2d 405; Jaco v. Baker, 
.48 P.2d 938, 174 Or. 191. 
Entry of the default judgment constituted admission by 
tespondents that they were guilty of willful and mali-
:ious injury to the property rights of Appellants within 
he meaning of the Bankruptcy Act in many particulars, 
ncluding but not limited to the following: 
(a) Their conversion of Appellants' trust funds held 
>y them in the sum of $2,831.37 (R. 4). 
(b) Their conversion of merchandise of Appellants (R. 
~'Par. 2; R. 4; R. 1-3). 
(c) Their conversion of unsold merchandise of Appel-
.ants which they failed to return when Appellants de-
nanded the return of said merchandise (R. 2, Par. 7). 
(d) Their conversion and/ or misappropriation of trust 
:unds of Appellants received from sale of Appellants' 
nerchandise. 
(e) Their conversion andjor misappropriation of trust 
:unds of Appellants collected from finance companies (R. 
L, Par. 5; R. 2, Par. 4; R. 8 & 9, Par. 1, 2, 3 & 5). 
(f) Their conversion of a truck and station wagon 
nortgaged to Appellants but sold by Respondents and the 
~roceeds misappropriated by Respondents in utter dis-
regard of the unrecorded chattel mortgage of Appellants 
(R. 2, Par. 5; R. 3, Par. 5 and 6; R. 8, Par. 4) which was 
1ot recorded at the request of Respondents and by reason 
)f the existing mortgage on said vehicles in favor of a 
1nance company (R. 8, Par. 4). 
The debt due to Appellants, which was merged into 
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their default judgment, is for willful and malicious in-
juries to the property rights of Appellants and accord-
ingly said debt was not discharged by Respondents' 
bankruptcy, it not being the purpose of the bankruptcy 
act to release a bankrupt from a judgment against him as 
a result of his fraud or his willful and malicious wrong-
·.doing. Koch v. Segler (Mo App), 331 SW 2d 126, 78 
ALR 2d 1220. 
Obtaining property by means of false pretenses 
The sale by Respondents of the vehicles upon which 
Appellants had a chattel mortgage and their appropria-
tion of the proceeds constitutes obtaining of property 
under false pretenses (9-1-13, UCA, 1953) and makes the 
liability to Appellants non-dischargeable under the bank-
ruptcy law [Sec. 17 (2) supra]. In a like manner the 
Respondents made their obligation to Appellants non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy by their misconduct de-
scribed in paragraph (a) through (e) above. 
Wilful and Malicious Injuries to the property of another 
The acts done by Respondents described in paragraphs 
(a) through (f) above all constitute wilful and malicious 
injuries to Appellants' property which render their obli-
gation to Appellants non-dischargeable in bankruptcy 
(Sec. 17 [2] supra). 
Ill will or special malice is not required, it being suffi-
cient that a wrongful act was done intentionally, without 
just cause or lawful support. Bank of Williamsville v. 
Amherst Motor Sales, 234 App. Div. 261, 254 NYS 825, 
20 Am. Bankr. Rep. (NS) 623. The default judgment en-
tered in our case conclusively establishes that the acts 
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:omplained of were done intentionally and without just 
:ause or lawful support, which is sufficient without more 
o prevent the discharge by bankruptcy of the debt owed 
,y Respondents to Appellants. 
The property injured need not be tangible or physical. 
Jrobst v. Jones, 262 Mich 678, 274 NW 779; 63 ALR 2d 
i50. The disposal of another's property without his knowl-
!dge or consent, done intentionally in disregard of what 
me knows to be his duty, is a wilful and malicious injury 
.o property which will prevent a discharge in bankruptcy. 
W:clntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205, 37 
). Ct. 38; Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR 
l426, 44 Am. Bankr. Rep. 504. 
Sale of pledged or mortgaged property by the mort-
~agor as in our case [see paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) 
)age 5] is clearly a wilful and malicious injury to the 
)roperty rights of another which prevents discharge of 
:he debt by bankruptcy as illustrated by the following 
!ases: 
(1) Wrongful sale of land subject to unrecorded deed 
~iven as mortgage. Probst v. Jones, 247 NW 779, 262 Mich. 
)78. 
(2) Sale of mortgaged mare by mortgagor who appro-
priated proceeds. Mason v. Sault, 108 A. 267, 93 Vt. 412. 
(3) Unlawful conversion of another's shares of stock 
md disposal thereof, the owner obtaining a judgment by 
iefault. VanEpps v. Aufdemkamp, 138 Cal. App. 622, 32 
P. 2d 1116. 
( 4) Refusal of consignee of eggs to return or pay for 
them. Re Nordlight, 3 F. Supp. 486, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep. 
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(NS) 481. 
(5) Taking another's cattle and appropriating them tc 
own use. Bever v. Swecker, 138 Iowa 721, 116 N.W. 704 
(6) Failure to pay over to bank the proceeds receivec 
from sale of engine which was mortgaged as security for 
loan. Sabinal Nat. Bank v. Bryant, 221 S.W. 940, 45 Am. 
Bankr. Rep. 549. 
The wrongful appropriation of funds of another as was 
doneinourcase [seepar. (a), (d) and (f),page5] is also 
a wilful and malicious injury to property which prevents 
the discharge of a debt in bankruptcy, as illustrated by 
the following cases: 
(7) Conversion to own use by merchant of money 
collected for creditor on assigned accounts. Baker v. Bry-
ant Fertilizer Co., 271 F. 473, 46 Am. Bankr. Rep. 579. 
( 8) Collecting and retaining money from interest in 
corporation after assigning said interest in corporation as 
security for loan. Re Binsky, 6 F. Supp 789,24 Am. Bankr. 
Rep. (NS) 170. 
(9) Collection by employee of wages after he had as-
signed them to creditor. Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga. 
459, 97 SE 78, 42 Am. Bankr. Rep. 400. 
(10) Conversion of unsold consigned goods after de-
mand for their return. Mathieu v. Goldbert, 156 F. 541; 
42 ALR 2d 906. 
(11) Conversion of money. Young v. City Natl. Bani< 
(Tex. Civ. App.). 
(12) Failure of an agent to pay over money collectec 
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1r his principal is a wilful and malicious injury to the 
1tter's property. In re Stenger, DC 1922, 283 F. 419. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' JUDGMENT WAS NOT DIS-
HARGED IN BANKRUPTCY BECAUSE DEBT WAS 
REATED BY RESPONDENTS' FRAUD, EMBEZZLE-
[ENT, MISAPPROPRIATION OR DEFALCATION 
THILE ACTING IN A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY. 
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. Code Anno-
lted 35) reads in part as follows: 
"Sec. 17 Debts Not Affected by a Discharge. -
a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt 
from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . 
( 4) were c1·eated by his fraud, embezzlement, mis-
appropriat~on, or defalcation while acting as an offi-
cer or in a fiduciary capacity; . .. " (emphasis added) 
The entry of the default judgment in this matter is an 
dmission by Respondents of every Traversable allegation 
E Appellants' cause of action (see discussion supra at 
age 6), including but not limited to the failure of 
1e Respondents to account to Appellants for their money 
nd property held by Respondents in a fiduciary capacity. 
Generally brokers, factors and commission merchants 
ave not been held to be "fiduciaries" within the meaning 
f the foregoing statute excepting certain debts from dis-
harge by bankruptcy ( 42 ALR 2d 896, 9 Am. Jur. 2d 
lankruptcy 604), however, there are a substantial num-
er of decisions to the contrary. 42 ALR 2d 902; 9 Am. 
ur. 2d Bankruptcy 604. The decisions seem to turn on the 
uestion of the nature of the trust, the "fiduciary" capa-
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city mentioned in the bankruptcy statute relating tc 
technical or express trusts and not to those trusts which 
the law implies from a contract or from the position oj 
parties to a transaction. 16 ALR 2d 1152, 9 Am. Jur. 
Bankruptcy 602 and cases there cited. Ordinary commer-
cial transactions where confidence is reposed in a person 
does not create a "fiduciary" relationship within the 
meaning of that act, however, without question, a trustee 
of an express trust is in a "fiduciary capacity" within the 
meaning of that statute. Culp v. Robey, 299 SW 846, 156 
ALR 217, Bracken v. Milner (CC MU) 104 F. 522. 
As to a part of the transactions between Appellants and 
Respondents the usual relationship of broker or factor 
does exist, however, our situation is different in that the 
parties expressly agreed that a trust relationship would 
exist. 
In addition to the "fiduciary relationship" existing with 
respect to goods delivered to Respondents on consign-
ment, the parties expressly agreed that a trust relation-
ship would exist in several instances, each of which trusts 
were breached by Respondents misappropriating the trust 
assets, including the following: 
(a) Respondents acknowledged that they were holding 
$2,831.37 of Appellants' funds in trust for Appellants (R. 
4, Par. 1), which funds were never remitted to Appellants 
(R. 1-3; R. 10). 
(b) Respondents agreed to hold all funds received from 
finance company reserves in trust for the benefit of Ap· 
pellants and to forthwith remit said funds to Appellant~ 
(R. 1, Par. 5; R. 2, Par. 4; R. 8, 9, Par. 1, 2, 3 and 5). Fund~ 
were collected from finance company reserves by Re· 
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>ondents and misappropriated by Respondents (R. 2, 
ar. 5). 
(c) Failure of Respondents to return the unsold mer-
1andise upon demand constitutes a breach of a "fidu-
lary" capacity which bars discharge of the debt in bank-
Jptcy. Mathieu v. Goldberg, CC NY 156 F. 541. 
(d) Failure of Respondents to account to Appellants 
>r proceeds received from wrongful sale by them of 
ehicles mortgaged to Appellants constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary relationship" within the meaning of foregoing 
~atute excepting such debts for discharge in bankruptcy. 
In each of the instances indicated in paragraphs (a) 
rrrough (d) above, an express trust existed between the 
arties, and in each instance the Respondents violated the 
,rovisions of Sec. 17 ( 4) of the bankruptcy act which 
~revents discharge of debts ". . . created by fraud, em-
ezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting 
.. in any fiduciary capacity; ... " and accordingly Re-
pondent's debt to Appellants was not discharged by his 
.ischarge in bankruptcy. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The issue before the Court is clear. Shall a man be 
permitted to mis-appropriate funds held in trust by him
1 
merchandise held on consignment, proceeds held in trust 
for another received from sale of that person's merchan-
dise, to collect and appropriate to his own use funds 
which have been assigned to another, and to sell property 
which has been mortgaged to another and appropriate the 
proceeds to his own use, and then to discharge the entire 
indebtedness in bankruptcy? The legislature has imposed 
rather severe penalties and sanctions for conduct of this 
type. The bankruptcy statute is designed to relieve a man 
of his just debts, not from debts incurred by fraud, 
embezzlement, misappropriation, defalcation, etc. by a 
fiduciary or from debts incurred as a result of false pre-
tenses or. wilful and malicious injuries to the property of 
another. What the Respondents did with the Appellants' 
property and funds which they were holding in trust 
andjor wrongfully appropriated to their own use is 
immaterial. It is clear that the acts done by Respondents 
were done intentionally and with full knowledge of the 
injury that would necessarily be sustained by Appellants 
therefrom. No man should be permitted to take advantage 
of his own deliberate wrongdoing. 
The District Court's order of perpetual stay of execu-
tion should be vacated, and Appellants should be per-
mitted to execute on their judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Appellants 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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